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t first glance, the notion of an “alternative
minimum tax” sounds wonderful. Who
would not want an alternative to her
everyday tax burden? Matters sour quick-
ly upon realizing that the amt is “alter-
native” in the same sense that drowning
is the alternative to swimming: taxpayers
are dragged into its reaches rather than opting in. Little surprise,
then, that the federal amt is nearly universally hated: Congress
wants to patch it; academics want to kill it altogether. 
But in recent years, almost certainly by accident, the amt
has developed into an important instrument of federalism,
helping to stabilize state budgets by boosting them in hard
times while tempering their rise in booms. 
To understand this “stabilizer” function, it is helpful to take
a step back and consider the many dilemmas of state finance in
a federation. Economic downturns make for tough fiscal times
for state and local governments. State belt-tightening has the
potential to drive up unemployment and drive down consumer
demand, further slowing the economy. As we write this article
in the summer of 2010, we see a steady stream of headlines warn-
ing that state budget cuts threaten to delay economic recovery.
The crisis underscores that any sensible strategy for managing
the ups and downs of the business cycle should include some
provision for ensuring that state revenues will ease the pain of
recessions and slowdowns, rather than compounding it.
Accordingly, we argue that the federal government can play
some role in stabilizing state budgets, leading us to the ques-
tion of how best to design such an intervention. Simply shift-
ing countercyclical programs such as unemployment insurance
to the federal budget would be somewhat helpful (albeit at some
cost to federalism), but would lead to undesirable distortions
in state policymakers’ incentives. Discretionary grants to hard-
hit states are unappealing because they may be too slow and tar-
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geted more by politics than economic need. On the other
extreme, a steady-state subsidy for state revenues — say, feder-
al revenue-sharing along the lines of the Canadian model — con-
tributes to overheating the economy during growth periods and
distorts state budgets upward. The ideal instrument, then, is
one that automatically directs federal dollars to a state only
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The federal tax system already contains a set of instruments
that approximate this ideal. The Tax Code grants state taxpayers
a deduction for the money they pay to their local government,
which in effect is a federal matching grant for eligible state levies.
We have found empirical evidence that the much-reviled
Alternative Minimum Tax acts to shut off this matching grant
when state economies are thriving. In combination, these pro-
visions help target federal dollars to struggling states.
In light of the present crisis, we obviously do not claim that
this support mechanism functions perfectly. Realistically, no
stabilization policy could entirely protect states from a reces-
sion of this magnitude, but we acknowledge a number of cur-
rent aspects of the amt that likely reduce its efficacy. Thus,
in a forthcoming Stanford Law Review paper, we suggest sev-
eral policy tweaks — some at the federal level, some that
could simply be adopted by states — that would make better
use of the support offered by the Tax Code. 
In any event, before policymakers inter the amt or patch
it beyond recognition, it is useful to consider whether we
have any ready substitutes for its current role as a fiscal sta-
bilizer for states.
WHY STABIL IZATION?
Some macroeconomists believe that government has a role in
remedying recessions through some form of stimulus, such
as looser monetary policy, increased spending, tax cuts, or
some combination of the three. There is little consensus in this
realm, however. Microeconomists are more united in their view
of recessions. The standard microeconomic story begins with
the diminishing marginal utility of wealth: it hurts a lot
more to lose a dollar when you have only 10 of them than
when you have 10 million. If someone expects his income to
fluctuate over time, he can ease the pain of the leanest times
by setting aside some money when he has plenty of it. That
is the usual story for why people save, borrow, or buy insur-
ance against some disaster: all three are just ways of moving
money from rich times to poor. These transfers are often
referred to as fiscal “smoothing” because they level out the
peaks and valleys of lifetime earnings 
The problem is that there are often failures in the markets
for individual borrowing, insurance, and even savings. It is
awfully hard to buy individual “recession unemployment
insurance” because the insurer cannot easily verify whether a
person is unemployed due to the recession or because he just
wants to stay home and eat beef jerky. 
Government-provided insurance programs, known as
“social insurance,” may prove superior to privately provided
insurance if they allow for larger pools in which to diversify
the underlying risk, or where there is adverse selection due to
information asymmetries about the underlying risk each per-
son faces. As a descriptive matter, social
insurance is generally provided with
respect to income losses resulting from
involuntary unemployment or more
general problems leading to poverty to
the near exclusion of private insurance.
Social insurance programs, generally
targeted at the chronically poor or eld-
erly populations, also exist in the health
insurance market alongside private
competitors. More-limited social insur-
ance programs include food stamps and
subsidized housing. 
STATE  STRUGGLES 
DURING RECESSIONS
As recent experience shows, states strug-
gle to provide effective social insurance
during recessions. State revenues are
largely tied to the business cycle: budg-
ets get tighter just when the need for
countercyclical spending increases.
Studies show that state spending tends
to fall just at those times when it would
be most needed. Unfortunately, there
are no viable state-level solutions to this
problem. States might make up for rev-
enue shortfalls by raising taxes, bor-
rowing, or drawing from existing sav-
ings. However, those options are
normatively unattractive, descriptively
unlikely as a political matter, or both.
Tax increases, in the absence of any federal subsidy, will be
a bad move on net economically for the state. Increases will
also likely be politically unpopular. First, tax rates should be
kept smooth over time in order to minimize deadweight loss-
es. If revenue needs increase unexpectedly, the state should
borrow, which allows it to spread the cost of meeting the need
more evenly over time. States are also constrained in their abil-
ity to raise taxes by the possibility that individuals and busi-
nesses may exit the state in response to tax rate increases. 
An obvious alternative to tax hikes for revenue-starved
states is borrowing. Public borrowing can take on a variety of
forms, ranging from a straightforward bank loan to the sale
of bonds of various kinds. Borrowing, however, may be prac-
tically difficult. Just as the possibility of exit constrains state
tax levels, so too does it limit states’ opportunity to borrow.
Indeed, under some conditions there is no difference between
taxes and debt. After all, debts are simply promises to pay,
which must be financed with future taxes. This principle is
known to economists as “Ricardian equivalence.” Assuming,
then, that Ricardian equivalence holds, states cannot mitigate
exit pressure by financing their expenditures through debt
rather than current tax increases. Even if Ricardian equivalence
is incomplete, expected future debts can still lead to high exit
pressure by depressing housing prices. 
Regardless of whether Ricardian equivalence holds, the fac-
tors that permit a state to borrow during downturns also may
make borrowing at the state level normatively unattractive.
Distortions in the political process may result in excess bor-
rowing during both bad times and good. The cost of these dis-
tortions may well outweigh any benefits that would accrue
from unconstrained debt-financed stimulus. 
One well-known set of reasons for excess borrowing is
tied to the incentive structure of rational voters and officials.
Public debt gives rise to an intertemporal fiscal externality in
which present voters do not fully take into account the costs
of borrowing on succeeding residents. In addition to the
intertemporal externality, state borrowing also involves some
interjurisdictional externalities. Default by one state can
increase credit costs for other states. Accordingly, each indi-
vidual state may take on more debt, and correspondingly
more default risk, than would an optimizing social planner. 
Similarly, all officials have a limited time horizon in office.
If the official wants to win reelection to extend that time, or
ring up “rents” from interest groups while she holds power,
then the value to her of enacting programs now will be much
greater than the cost of paying for those programs after she
is out of office. Term-limited officials in their final year, for
example, have been found to be much freer with their con-
stituents’ money than others. 
While federal officials also face these kinds of pressures, the
dynamic is especially acute at the state and local level. Each
subnational jurisdiction faces competitive pressure to deliv-
er services now at a better price than its competitors. One way
for local officials to compete successfully is to shift the tax cost
of providing current services into the future. If Ricardian
equivalence does not hold, voters might deem the official who
uses debt to finance government to be outperforming the
neighboring officials who raise taxes.
Given the political dynamics we have just described, it is
unsurprising that many states have tied their officials’ hands
by sharply limiting their own capacity to take on debt, with
important consequences for state stabilization capability.
Few if any of these limits contain any facial exception for bor-
rowing in times of great need. Whatever one’s view of the nor-
mative desirability of borrowing, it is evident that the threat
of excessive indebtedness has given rise to a legal system in
which states are constrained in their ability to borrow at any
time, including times when it is urgently needed.
Savings, such as through a state “rainy day” fund, serve as
a possible crisis-funding alternative to tax increases and bor-
rowing. Unfortunately, many of the dynamics that threaten
to cause runaway borrowing also tend to undermine the use-
fulness of rainy day funds. All of the relevant actors, from indi-
vidual voters to elected officials, have strong incentives to pre-
fer current over deferred spending. It is not surprising that
data show few states save nearly enough money to protect
themselves against later downturns. 
TRADIT IONAL FEDERAL SOLUTIONS 
AND THEIR  D ISCONTENTS
This all suggests an important role for the federal government
in social insurance. A federal role is especially significant in
the modern interconnected economy in which the fiscal
struggles of one state may lead to trouble for the state’s
neighbors and trading partners. 
There is an extensive and generally inconclusive literature
on the role of the federal government in redistributing wealth.
While centralized redistribution mitigates some problems, it
also sacrifices other federalism values. For example, one set
of federal policymakers cannot easily capture all social pref-
erences for redistribution or social insurance; redistribution
at the local level allows individuals to sort themselves accord-
ing to their preferences. 
An additional problem is that federal provision of social
insurance induces moral hazard at the state policymaking
level. Where insurance is provided federally, states are able to
externalize much of the downside risk of their regulation.
Since each state receives all of the benefit but pays little of the
cost of establishing the common insurance pool, it actually
has incentives to draw down the pool before others can do the
same, leading it to enact ever-riskier policies. Because the
taxing jurisdiction does not bear the full cost of its policies,
it does not take into account the full extent of its costs to oth-
ers, including potential cyclical effects. For instance, a state
may be relatively indifferent to the possibility that the cost of
bailing it out of a regional crisis could increase the federal gov-
ernment’s own costs of borrowing, or even the chances of a
national downturn, as its citizens would bear only a small frac-
tion of the costs of either outcome. 
The traditional solution to moral hazard in insurance is co-
payments, but partial federal-financing programs, such as
matching grants, face serious challenges in this context.
Matching grants can result in misallocation of federal dollars.
For one, subsidies intended to be counter-cyclical are waste-
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ful if they cannot be turned off when jurisdictions emerge
from recession, diminishing federal resources available for
insurance in regions still struggling. Additionally, since match-
ing grants by definition require state expenditures, fiscally
strapped states may draw less funding. As a result of these fac-
tors, partial financing may actually move money in the wrong
direction, from places where the economy is struggling to
those where it is succeeding. More generally, economists
argue that federal supports raise state expenditures above the
level state citizens would have chosen in an undistorted polit-
ical market. Also, subsidies for state spending might lead to
some inflationary pressure in boom times.
Making federal fiscal supports temporary or discretionary
solves some of these problems, but raises others.
Macroeconomists argue that the delays and political costs that
attend enacting discretionary programs greatly reduce the
effectiveness of any resulting expenditure. Perhaps the most
important aspect of countercyclical spending is its timing.
Discretionary programs mean that the timing of funds will
depend on politics, not economic necessity. Discretionary
spending can be too fast as well as too slow: if the downturn
is prolonged, or the deepest state budget holes lag behind the
onset of the decline, then immediate spending is not optimal. 
Because of these concerns, experts claim that “automatic”
stabilizers are much preferable to grant programs. For exam-
ple, Christina Romer has found historical evidence that auto-
matic stabilizers were considerably more effective than dis-
cretionary policies in recessions. Automatic stabilization by
definition cannot pay out too fast, since it lasts exactly as long
as the downturn lasts. 
What is needed, then, is federal fiscal support for states that
turns off automatically in good times, but turns on in down-
turns when the need for stimulus may outweigh the costs of
policy distortions. Is it possible to design a state fiscal support
that only operates when states need the money, keeping in
mind that complex formulae that must be ruled on by bureau-
crats are emphatically not automatic? Glad you asked.
THE AMT AS  AN AUTOMATIC  STABIL IZER
Surprisingly, the federal amt already acts as an automatic sta-
bilizer. The amt achieves its stabilizer effect by phasing out
an existing federal matching grant for state revenues. Section
164 of the Tax Code allows an income tax deduction for the
cost of taxes paid to state and local governments, known in
the lingo as the “salt” deduction. The salt deduction acts
like a federal matching grant for certain state tax revenues
because, for every dollar a taxpayer pays her state and local gov-
ernments in income and property taxes, she reduces her fed-
eral tax bill by $1 times her marginal federal rate. For a tax-
payer in the top federal bracket, each dollar of state income
tax reduces her federal tax by 35 cents. 
The amt sometimes curtails the salt subsidy. The amt
forces taxpayers to re-compute their tax burden under a
somewhat different set of rules, paying whichever is higher.
The amt also disallows a number of the standard tax system’s
deductions and credits. However, it imposes a top marginal
rate of only 28 percent. 
An implication of this structure is that the amtmakes use-
less a number of deductions and exclusions available under the
Code. Consider the example of Taxpayer A, who instead of tak-
ing the standard deduction and personal exemption, claims
exemption for numerous children and itemizes his deduc-
tions, reducing his $100,000 gross income to $51,000 in taxable
income. Taxpayer A’s tax liability under the standard system is
about $9,088. The amt does not permit exemption for addi-
tional dependents; suppose Taxpayer A’s itemized deductions,
too, are not permitted under the amt. In that case, his amt lia-
bility is $13,858. Since that is the higher amount, he pays it.
Thus, Taxpayer A is “subject” to the amt, increasing his tax by
about $4,000. In effect, the amt has “turned off” part of
Taxpayer A’s itemized deductions and personal exemptions. 
Because of the amt’s large exclusion amount, the likeli-
hood of being subject to amt liability probably increases
with income, at least at low and moderate income levels.
Under the standard income tax, individual taxpayers pay no
tax until they earn about $10,000 because of the combination
of the personal exemption and standard deduction. Under the
amt, there is no standard deduction, but the personal exemp-
tion is very large, so that an individual paid no tax in 2009
until she earned about $46,700. (This exclusion amount is not
indexed for inflation, which is why more and more people
have become subject to amt liability over the years.) Thus, if
Taxpayer A’s gross income were less than $46,700, the amt
could not have affected him, because amt liability for every-
one earning less than $46,700 is zero. And the amt liability
for those earning $46,701 is only 26 cents. Thus, the likelihood
of becoming “subject” to the amt is the result of a combi-
nation of increasing income and increasing use of deductions
and exemptions prohibited by the amt. This connection
between the amt and income is central to our argument.
Turning back to the salt deduction, the amtmodifies the
salt subsidy by reducing the size of the matching grant for
economically thriving jurisdictions. The salt deduction is not
permitted under the amt, and as we have just explained, the
amt only comes into play at higher income levels. Accordingly,
T a b l e  1
The AMT as an Automatic Stabilizer








Gross Income $900 $900
State Income Tax Rate 11% 16.5%
State Income Tax Amount $100 $150
Reduction in Federal Tax
(assume marginal rate of 33%)
$0 $50
State Tax Net of Federal Tax $100 $100
Effective State Income Tax Rate 11% 11%
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as incomes in a state rise, more and more of the state’s tax-
payers will exceed the amt’s personal exemption threshold,
turning off some or all of their salt deduction under the
amt. Conversely, as incomes fall, the amt’s effects will dimin-
ish, turning the salt subsidy back on. 
This variable, countercyclical subsidy has at least two dis-
tinct stabilization effects for states. First, it can mitigate most
of the constraints states normally face in maintaining or
increasing tax rates during downturns. The amt/salt com-
bination allows states to achieve similar effective net-of-fed-
eral tax rates during crises, as we illustrate in Table 1.
The second effect of the amt/salt combination is to
allow a careful state to increase taxes without reducing con-
sumers’ marginal propensity to spend on other consumer
goods. Again, countercyclical federal subsidies act as inter-
jurisdictional transfers, increasing the wealth of a region
affected by a downturn. If the state absorbs no more than this
transfer amount in increased taxes, consumer spending will
be unaffected. Table 2 illustrates this. Alternately, even if the
state does not increase its tax revenues or its spending, there
will be some stimulative effect from the salt deduction
because the state’s citizens will be the beneficiaries of trans-
fers from less-affected parts of the country, raising their
wealth available for consumption. 
To see how the amt works as an automatic stabilizer in
this framework, note that because social insurance pro-
grams are normal goods, when the individual’s income
increases, so does his demand for the program. However,
given that the application of the amt is positively related to
income, the amount of the federal subsidy will decline with
income until it reaches zero. These two effects of changing
income will have opposite effects on the quantity of the
social insurance program demanded. Thus, in times of eco-
nomic growth, while the person’s income effect will induce
him to demand more of the program, the price effect will
induce him to demand less, as the amt phases out the fed-
eral subsidy. In times of recession, as incomes drop, the
income effect will induce a lower demand, while the price
effect will induce a higher demand because the amt phase-
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out revives the federal subsidy. Thus, as a theoretical mat-
ter, the amt is countercyclical, dampening demand swings
caused by changes in income. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE  
AMT’S  STABIL IZER  EFFECTS
Theory and a dollar will get you a ride on the bus, however,
so we look to the data for some empirical validation. If we
compare the percentage of individuals who are subject to
the amt in a jurisdiction with the amount of spending on
social insurance programs in that jurisdiction, our hypothe-
sis suggests that higher amt liability will reduce spending, due
to the increased net-of-federal-tax cost of local taxes. This
effect will be counter-cyclical to the extent that higher amt
liability occurs at the same time as higher state gross domes-
tic product, and vice-versa. Thus, we first examine whether
states with high gdp experienced higher amt liability.
Using Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income data
from 2004 (the first year amt data were collected) to 2007, we
plot in Figure 1 the relationship between state per capita
gdp and the fraction of income tax filers who paid a positive
amt on their federal return. The data include observations for
all 50 states. In addition to the scatterplot, we provide a lin-
ear best-fit line through the data as well as its 95 percent con-
fidence interval.
Figure 1 shows a statistically significant positive relation-
ship between amt incidence and state per capita income. We
show a number of variations of this test in our Stanford Law
Review paper, all consistent with the theory that higher gdp
corresponds with higher amt liability.
Next, we collected data on state per capita spending in four
common social insurance categories: welfare spending, edu-
cation spending, spending on hospitals, and spending on
other public health programs. Because our four years of data
provide a relatively small sample, we expect that our esti-
mates will be relatively imprecise, limiting our ability to make
strong inferences. That is, the large standard errors likely to
be associated with our estimated coefficients suggest we will
have low power, making it harder for us to reject the hypoth-
esis that there is no relationship between amt coverage and
state spending.
To account for any effects of inflation on state spending,
we use the Consumer Price Index to deflate all expenditure
and income amounts to a constant price level. Because our
outcome variables are per capita spending, which we use to
provide estimates that are representative of average effects
across the nation, we perform weighted least squares using
state population as the weight in each regression.
Our empirical specification includes our amt coverage
variable and the state income variable as discussed above. Also,
to isolate the effect of amt coverage, we include dummy vari-
ables for each state. These so-called state fixed effects allow
for heterogeneity across states in their baseline level of spend-
ing. For idiosyncratic reasons, such as cultural differences or
other path dependencies, some states may naturally spend
more on social insurance programs than others. The state
fixed effects allow us to control for these differences, which
T a b l e  2
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Gross Income $900 $900
State Tax Amount $100 $150
Federal Tax Amount




Total Tax Paid $400 $400
Net After-Tax Income $500 $500
is important if the differences are not random with respect to
the amt coverage variable. We also include dummy variables
for each year, to allow for the possibility that spending may
be systematically higher (or lower) in a given year across all
states. Reasons for this may include national macro eco-
nomic changes or policy changes at the federal level that
induce a change in spending everywhere.
Our first analysis looks at real (i.e., deflated) state per
capita spending across education, welfare, hospitals, and
public health in the aggregate. We first examine total amt cov-
erage. However, there is reason to believe that not everyone
accurately predicts whether the amt will be binding on him
or her. This implies that errors in expectations will affect
whether an individual supports spending or not. Our hypoth-
esis is that higher-income people will be better able to predict
that they will be affected by the amt. To examine this, we con-
sidered five different measures of amt coverage:
n the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive
amt amount; 
n the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive
amt amount for individuals with incomes above
$50,000; 
n the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive
amt amount for individuals with incomes above
$75,000; 
n the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive
amt amount for individuals with incomes above
$100,000; and 
n the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive
amt amount for individuals with incomes above
$200,000. 
Our expectation is that we will observe greater precision
of any amt effect in the higher income ranges. 
In every case, we find a nega-
tive relationship between amt
coverage and total per capita state
spending. When examining all
social spending together, the
effect is statistically significant
once the amt share variable is
calculated for filers with incomes
of $75,000 or above. As expected,
the precision of the estimates
improves as the amt share is cal-
culated for higher-income filers.
We also find evidence that state
spending on social insurance pro-
grams does appear to be a normal
good, with positive per capita
gdp coefficients, but the effect
is not statistically significant. This
is most likely due to the lack of
precision that comes with our
four-year sample.
In terms of the practical size
of the effects we estimate, if the
fraction of amt coverage among filers earning more than
$50,000 increased by a standard deviation, our results imply
that total real per capita state spending would decline by
about 4 percent. The comparable effect of an increase in the
fraction of amt filers with incomes above $200,000 is an 8 per-
cent decline in per capita spending. Thus, states in roughly the
top one-sixth of the national distribution of amt liability
would spend 8 percent less on social insurance annually than
the median state — tens of millions of dollars each year. The
exact magnitude of these figures is less interesting, however,
than the fact that the practical size of the effect we have
identified is non-trivial from a policy perspective. We find even
larger effects for health-related categories.
Thus, despite the fact that data limitations generate sig-
nificant precision problems, we find robust support for our
hypothesis that as amt coverage increases, holding state per
capita income constant, state spending on social insurance
programs declines. This evidence is consistent with our claim
that the amt acts as a fiscal stabilizer.
CONCLUSION
The amt is, we admit, an unlikely place to find a solution to
the problem of state finance in times of crisis. Each of the more
obvious candidates, however, has serious flaws. States cannot
tax, borrow, or save enough to meet their residents’ needs for
social insurance. Other federal supports lead to moral hazard,
are wasteful, or are too poorly timed to be effective. Thus, auto-
matic stabilizers assume an important role in smoothing
incomes. And, as the data suggest, the amt is a powerful
automatic stabilizer.
Accordingly, we would resist efforts to repeal or “patch” the
amt. Instead, we suggest that greater attention to the details
of the amt, and the tax-lawmaking process that surrounds it,
can greatly improve state responsiveness to recessions. 
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The AMT and State Income
Correlation between AMT filings and income, by state
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